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vs. 
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Department of Business Regulation, : 
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APPELLANTS1 REPLY BRIEF 
As allowed by Rule 50(e), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Appellants now submit the following Reply Brief to 
address arguments and matters first raised by the Appellees in 
their brief. 
Appellants will address two separate points concerning the 
Appellee's brief. 
(1) Appellees' counsel states many so-called facts in his 
brief and particularly on pages 2 and 3 of the brief (and in the 
footnotes). None of these statements make reference to the 
record. Many of the references in fact are not even in the 
record at all. This is improper appellate procedure and is an 
attempt to color the case against the Appellants by use of 
matters that are not even properly before the Court, nor 
necessarily accurate. 
(2) Appellees claim that although the Court of Appeals 
didn't deal with the issue of collateral estoppel directly it 
implied that the doctrine is a bar to the Appellants' defense 
and allowed the action of the Utah Securities Division to be 
affirmed. However, if the Court of Appeals would uphold the 
decision of a lower court, it should and must do so 
affirmatively rather than by way of a questionable implication. 
Rather, if any implications are to be drawn, the fair 
implication is that the Court of Appeals either didn't feel that 
collateral estoppel was a sufficient basis for the affirmance, 
or it decided that it didn't need to consider whether collateral 
estoppel applied or not since it opted to rule as it did on the 
other issues. The question became moot and it left the 
collateral estoppel argument alone. 
Appellants submit in any event that the doctrine of 
collateral does not apply here for a several important reasons, 
summarized as follows: 
Collateral estoppel cannot apply to the issue of the 
statutory authority of the Appellee inasmuch as Appellants never 
had the opportunity to fully litigate the argument that Section 
61-1-20 of the Utah Code does not give statutory authority to 
suspend the trading of the stock of the various corporate 
Appellants, as discussed in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
The suggestion that Section 61-1-20 could give the 
necessary authority was only first raised by the Court of 
Appeals in its decision in Amenity. It was not an issue in the 
District Court nor before the Utah Securities Division. There 
has been no chance previous to this appeal to argue that that 
section of the Utah Code does not authorize the action taken by 
the Appellees (Originally in Amenity, the issue was whether 
Section 61-1-7 gave authority to the Appellee to suspend the 
trading exemptions). 
It is also important to consider that this case is a 
completely separate proceeding involving different corporations 
and the suspension of their stock than were involved in Amenity. 
There was a separate evidentiary hearing with different 
witnesses and significantly different evidence on the good 
faith/bad faith gift issue. 
This case is not in itself a relitigation of anything. 
Rather we have a question of whether once one, who is accused of 
illegal activity, loses in court thereafter forfeits his right 
to a hearing and judicial review when a second allegation of 
similar illegal conduct is alleged in a new case. 
If Appellees1 collateral estoppel argument is accepted, 
then a reviewing court is prevented from even considering the 
wording of the relevant statutes and evidence adduced at the 
hearing on this case, although similar allegations of violations 
are involved, and the accused is thus prevented from his 
statutorily mandated right to judicial review. 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel was never intended to 
go that far. If so, why even have the second hearing - if an 
administrative agency can win at the first hearing, all it would 
have to do thereafter is make new allegations of similar 
misconduct in another matter and the accused is left 
defenseless, even though the evidence may not be the same and 
mistakes in applying the statutes may have escaped attention 
previously. 
Appellants maintain that their Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari lists three very good reasons why the Supreme Court 
should exercise its power of supervision and review the decision 
of the Court of Appeals, despite Appellees' claim that 
Appellants1 stated reasons didn't directly mirror the examples 
of reasons for granting a petition for Writ of Certiorari, as 
found in Rule 46, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Finally, it is instructive to consider that the Appellees' 
brief did not address or attempt to refute Appellants' argument 
that no section of the Utah Code authorizes the Utah Securities 
Division to take the action taken against the Appellants (Point 
One of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari). Appellees' 
reliance in its brief on specious technicalities and out of the 
record allegations certainly indicate, along with the failure to 
address the issue at all, that Point One of the Appellants' 
Petition is correct and should be seriously considered by this 
Court in determining to accept this case for review. 
The space limitations of this reply brief certainly do not 
allow for further discussion of the matter here. Yet, from a 
consideration of the Appellants1 Petition, it is seen that this 
Court should grant the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
Respectfully submitted this IS^day p^ Hflay, 1992. 
Phillip B. feKell 
Day & Barney 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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